Axiomatic development of theories is common practice in pure mathematics and is also now widely used in many sciences. The main ingredients of the methods for axio~natizing theories are the following: statement of the primitive concepts of the theory, statement of the prior mathematics basis assumed. statement of the axioms. characterization of niodels of the theory and a definition of two such models having the same structure. Theories formulated in this way can easily satisfy the standard set-theoretical approach to axiomatization. The further step of formalizing the language of the theory, especially in the case of elementary theories, can lead to specific positive and negative results about the axioniatizability of theories in restricted languages.
I . Historical Backgro~117d
Of all the remarkable intellectual achievements of ancient Greek civilization, none has had greater subsequent impact than the developnient or the axiomatic ~netliod of analysis. N o serious traces are to be found in the earlier civilizations of Babylon, China, Egypt, or India. The exact history of the beginnings is not known. but elements that can now be identified emerged in the fifth century BC. A good reference is Knorr ( 1975) . What can be said, and is important for the subsequent discussion here, is that, already in the next century, the fourth century BC, the detailed and elaborate theory of proportion of Eudoxus emerged in quite a clear and definite axiomatic form. most of which is preserved in Book V of Euclid's Elenienrs (Euclid 1925) . What is important about E u d o~u~'~ work, and even the commentaries of the work of this time, for example, by Aristotle, in the Poslerior Ar~a!l-.!ics (1994 74a-17) . is that the theorems were proved, not for single geometric objects, but for magnitudes in general, when applicable. The recog. nition of the correct abstraction in the general concept of magnitude, its technical and thorough ilnplementation by Eudoxus and the philosophical commentary by Aristotle, represent a genuinely new intellectual development. The language of E u d o x u~'~ famous Definition V in Book V of Euclid's Elernetits matches in its abstractness and difficulty the standards of modern axiomatic theories in mathenlatics and the sciences.
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The codification of the Greek axiomatic approach in Euclid's Elerrients was a great success and remained almost unchallenged until difficulties in the dekails were found in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as discussed later.
Various scientific examples of axiomatic theories existed already in ancient Greek times and, of course, from the Greek standpoint. they were regarded as essentially homogeneous with the axioniatic theory of geometry, no sharp distinction being made between geometry and mechanics, for instance. A good example is Archimedes' set of partial qualitative axioms For measuring weights on balances. This is undoubtedly the first partial qualitative axioma~ization of conjoint measurement, a form of measurenient that has received both much axioniatic attention and manifold applications in modern theories of measurement in the social sciences. (For detailed treatment of conjoint measurement, see Krantz et al. 197 1. Alsosee
Measurer?ient T l i e o y : Cocjoirrt.)
Other early examples of axioniatic theories aimed at empirical matters can be found in the large medieval literature on qualitative axioms for the nieasurement of weight (Moody and Clagett 1952) . Even more impressive examples are to be found in the medieval literature on physics. Some of the most s~~b t l e and interesting work is that of'Nicole Oresnie ( 1 968) in the fourteenth century. (See especially his treatise, example for Oresme would be that of a surface being more or less white.
Finally, in the geometric axiomatic tradition of analyzing phenomena in natural science, the two great late examples of deeply original work were the seventeenth-century treatises of Huygens' The Pendulum Clock (Huygens 1673 (Huygens /1986 . And, of course, as the' second example, Newton's Principia (Newton 16871 1946) . Both Huygens and Newton formulated their axioms in the qualitative geometric style of Euclid and other Greek geometers two thousand years earlier.
Axiomatic Geometr'y in the Nineteenth Century
Without question, development in axiomatic methods in the nineteenth century was the perfection and formalization of the informal Greek methods that had dominated for so many centuries. The initial driving force behind this effort was certainly the discovery and development of non-Euclidean geometries at the beginning of the century by Bolyai, Lobachevski, and Gauss. An important development later in the century was the discovery of Pasch's (1882) axiom a s a necessary addition to the Euclidean formulation. Pasch found a. gap in Euclid which required a new axiom, namely, the assertion that if a line intersects one side of a triangle, it must also intersect a second side. This was just the beginning for Pasch. He created the modern conception of formal axiomatic methods, which has been the central aspect of the model for axiomatic work up until present times. The axiomatic example in geometry that had the most widespread influence was Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie, first published in 1897 and still being circulated in later editions (Hilbert 1956 ).
Ingredients oJSrandard Axiomaric Practice
Building, especially, on the work in the later part of the nineteenth century in axiomatizing geometry, early in the twentieth century there was widespread axiomatization in mathematics and, to a lesser extent, in the empirical sciences. The main ingredients of the methods for axiomatizing theories were the following: statement of the primitive concepts of the theory, statement of the prior mathematics basis assumed, statement of the axioms, characterization of models of the theory and a definition for isomorphism of two such models, proof of a representation theorem when Possible, and, finally, some analysis of invariance of the models of the theory. Before turning to an explicit discussion of these ingredients, it is worth noting that the emphasis should really be on models of the theory, which is what axiomatizing a theory makes clear. F o r ltis models of the theory, i.e., structures which satisfy Axiomatic Theories the theory, as explained in Sect. 2.3;thal exhibit the nature of the theory, whether it be in geometry, economics, psychology or some other science. (For an elementary, but detailed, account of the concepts discussed in this section, see Suppes (19571 1999, Chaps. 8 and 12).)
Primitive Concepts of a Theory
The first point to recognize in axiomatizing a theory is that some concepts are assumed as primitive. Their properties are to be stated in the axioms, and, therefore, it is important to know how many such concepts there are and what is their general formal character, as relations, functions, etc. In Hilbert's axioms for elementary plane geometry, the five primitive concepts are those of point, line, plane, betweenness, and congruence. In contrast, in psychological theories of measurement, a n ordering of the stimuli or other phenomena is almost always assumed-in this case, a weak ordering; that is, a binary relation that is transitive and connected, rather than the geometric ordering of betweenness. In addition to a primitwe concept of ordering, there are other relations, for example, a primitive concept of the comparisoil of stimulus differences or an operation of combination for extensive measurement, as in the case of subjective probability. These measurement examples also apply to a large literature on utility and subjective probability in economics. In psychological theories of learning, even of the simplest nature, we would need such concepts as that of stimulus, response and a conditioning relation between stimulus and response. Theories without much more elaboration would require the important concept of similarity or resemblance, in order to develop a theory of the fundamental psychological phenomena of generalization, discrimination and transfer.
There are also important theories that use much simpler primitive concepts. A good example would be the theory of zero-sum, two-person games in normal form. The primitive concepts are just that of two nonempty sets X and Y that are arbitrary spaces of strategies for the two persons and a numerical function M, defined on the product space X x Y. The intuitive interpretation of M is that it is the payoff or the utility function for the player whose space is X. The negative of that is the payoff for the player whose space is Y. Later a representation theorem is given for finite games of this sort.
Axioms as Defining Theories
As is widely recognized, axioms are what intuitively characterize a theory, whether it be of geometry, game theory or a psychological theory of measurement. From a formal standpoint, something more can be said. The essence of the matter is that to axiomatize a theory is to define a certain set-theoretical predicate. This is'just as valid in the empirical sciences as in pure mathematics. The axioms, of course, are the most important part of such a definition.
Because the theory of weak orderings is used widely in both economics and psychology, as part of the theory of choice, it will be useful to give a formal definition. and, therefore, the axioms for a weak ordering.
Definition 1 Let A be a nonempty set and R abinary relation on A, i.e., let R be a subset of the product space A x A. A structure ( A , R ) is a weak ordering ifand only if the following two axioms are satisjied, for every a , b and c in A:
Axiom 1 R is transitive on A, i.e., ifaRy and bRc then aRc.
Axiom 2 R is connected on A, i.e., aRb or bRa.
There are various general methodological and folklore recommendations about the way in which axioms should be written--clarity, lack of ambiguity and simplicity are familiar. More substantive results about the form of axioms are discussed in Sect. 4 on first-order formalization. There are many definite mathematical results about the form of axioms, some of which are also discussed later.
Independence of Axioms
An early and important substantive recommendation is that the axioms be independent; i.e., none can be derived from the others. The question then arises from a methodological standpoint: How is independence to be established? The answer is in terms of models o f the axioms. To make the matter still more explicit, we consider possible realizations of the theory. These are set-theoretical structures that have the right form. For example, in the case of weak orders, a possible realization is an ordered pair consisting o f a nonempty set and a blnary relation o n that set. Such an arbitrary pair is called a possible realization because a s a possible realization it is not a m o h l of the theory unless the axioms of the theory are also satisfied. An obvious example of a model of the theory of weak ordering is the pair consisting of the set of positive integers and the relation of weak inequality 2 .
The independence of a given axiom of a theory is established by finding a possible realization of the theory in which all the axioms, except the particular one in question, are satisfied. The deductive argument to show that this yields a proof of independence is intu~tively obvious and will not be made In a more formal manner here. But the essence is that if the concept were not independent, but definable, then it would necessarily hold in the' model, just like the remaining axioms, and so a contradiction of its both holding and not holding in the given model would be obtained. So, by reductio ad absurdum it must be independent. It will be useful to consider an example or two.
To show that the axiom of connectedness for weak orders is independent of the axiom of transitivity, it is necessary to take a possible realization that is also a transitive relation. So, let A = { l , 2, 3) and R = {l, 2). In other words, R is just the strict numerical < relation on the subset {I, 2) of A. Then it is obvious that this relation is transitive but not connected for the number 3, which is in the set A, and does not stand in the relation R to any other element in A. To show that transitivity is independent of connectedness, that is, Axiom 1 for weak orders is independent of Axiom 2, it is sufficient to take the same set A as before, but now, the relation R is the set of the ordered pairs {(I, 2), (2,3), (3, I), (1, I), (2, 2), (3, 3)). Then it is clear that any two elements in the set A are connected by the relation R, but the relation R is not transitive, for, in order to be transitive, it must also have the pairs (I, 3): (2, 1) and (3, 2).
The examples of independence given are trivial, but it is to be emphasized that it can often be a difficult task to establish whether or not an axiom is independent of the remaining axioms; that is, whether or not it can be derived from the remaining axioms. A very familiar mathematical example, with a long history in the twentieth century, is the proof that the axiom of choice is independent of the other standard axioms of set theory.
Padoa's Principle for Proving Independence q/ Primitive Concepts
Less familiar than proving the independence of axioms is the method of using models of a theory to prove independence of the piimitive concepts of the theory. To prove that a particular primitive concept of a theory, for. -example, the notion of congruence in Euclidean geometry, is independent of the other primitive concepts, it is sufficient to find two models of the theory, such that the domain of both models is the same, the two models are the same for all the other primitive concepts of the theory, but the two models differ only in their realization of the concept in question. Thus, to prove congruence independence, what is required are two different models of the axiom in question, which are the same for all the other concepts, such as point, line, etc., but which have two distinct notions of congruence.
In the case of weak orders, Padoa's principle can be used in an obvious way to show that the concept of the binary relation is independent of the given set A. It suffices, for example, to use the two different orderings <, 2 on the set of positive integers. On the other hand, since R is connected,-the set A is definable in. terms of the relation R for the special case of weak orderings by taking the union of the domain and range of tlie relation. But for diKerelAlt orderings, for example, partial orderings, which are reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive on the set A, it is easy to show that the set A is an independent concept. Just let A in one model be a proper subset in tlie other, and elemen~s in tlie relation come only from the first set.
The separation of the purely set-theoretical characterization of the possible realizations of a theory from the axioms proper, which characterize models of a theory, is significant in defining certain important concepts. For example, the notion of two models of a theory being isolnorphic is often said to be axiom-free, since the definition of isomorphism of the models of a theory really depends on just the set-theoretical characterization of the possible realizations. A satisfactory general definition of isomorphism for the structures that are possible realizations of any sort of theory is difficult, if not impossible, t o formulate. The usual practice is to formulate a special definition for the possible realizations of some particular theory. This is what will be done here, as already illustrated in the case of binaryrelations. A possible realization is a settheoretical structure that is a nonempty set and a binary relatioii whose domain and range are included in that set. In this case the definition of isomorphism is as follows. The definition of isoinorphis~n for possible realizations of a theory is used to formulate a representation theorem, which has the following meaning. A certain class of structures or models of the axiomatized theory is distinguished for some intuitive or systematic reason and is shown to exeinplify within isomorphism every other model of the theory. This means that, given any model of the theory, there exists in this distinguished class an isomorphic model. A good example of this can be found in the axiomatic theory of extensivemeasurement. Given any empirical structure that represents the data about subjective judgments of probability and satisfies the axioms of the theory, there is a flunierical structure satisfying the axionis that is lsoniorphic to the empirical structure. Note, of course, that there is not any one single such isomorphism. Different individuals can have different empirical structures realizing their subjective probabilities, but there will be for each of the111 a particular numerical model of the axioms that is isomorphic to each given empirical structure.
Here is a simple and obvious, but. usef~~l., exampleof a representation result for two-person, zero-sulii gamnes that are finite. A-game (X, Y, M ) , as introduced earlier, is finite just in case tlie sets X and Yare finite. So., with the definition of isoinorphism obvio~is froin the result now to be stated, ally finite game 
h7variance Theoren~s for Asion.~ati~ed Theories
In addition to having representation theorems for the models of a given axiomatized theory, it is also significant and useful to have explicit invariance theorems. The intuitive idea of invariance is most naturally explained either in terms of geometric theories or measurement theories.
Given a class of models, for example, analytical models in geometry and numerical models in measurement, w~t h respect to which any other model of the theory can be represented, the invariance theorem is a n expression of how unique is the representation in terms ol' such an analytic model. For example, in the case of the representation theorem for axiomatic formulations of Euclidean geometry, the invariance theorem states that any analytic model is unique only up to the group of Euclidean motions. Thismeans that for any analytic representation of Euclidean geometry, any reflections, rotations or translations of the analytic model will produce a new analytic model, also isomorphic to the set-theoretical model satisfying the qualitative synthetic axioms of Euclidean geometry. In fact, the most general theorem widens the scope to what is often called the group of generalized Euclidean transformations, namely, those that also permit a change in scale, so that no unit of measurement is fixed.
The situation is very similar in the case of theories of measurement. Given an empirical structure and a representing nunierical model isomorphic to that structure, then, in the case of intensive quantities such as cardinal utility. for example. the numerical model is unique only up to the group of affine transformations; that is, transformations that multiply the unit or measurement by a positive real number and add a constant as well. This means that in f~~iidamental measurement of a cardinal utility there is nothing but convention in the choice of a unit of measurement or a zero value.
Classical examples of important invariant theorems in physics are that structures of classical physics
Axionzntic Theories
are invariant up to Galilean transformations, and in special relativity, invariant up to Lorenz transformations-in both these cases, further generalizations arise .by also permitting changes in the units of measu remen t .
Theories with Stnndard Fortnaliration
The set-theoretical framework for axiomatizing tlieories just discussed is used implicitly throughout the mathematical social sciences. Most of the axiomatic work that takes place in the social sciences can be put in a straightforward way within the framework just described. On the other hand, there is a tighter framework for discussing the axiomatization of theories that leads to clarification of problems that arise in the conceptual or qualitative thinking about theories in the social sciences. Tlie purpose of this section is to describe in an informal way this more narrowly defined framework and to give a sense of the kind of results that can be obtained. Most of the results are of a negative sort, important because they show what cannot be done by apparently very natural qualitative formulations of theories of preference, of subjective probability or related kinds of qualitative measurement, or scaling problems, especially in econo~nics and psychology. but also in anthropology, political science, and sociology.
A language with standard formalization is a language that is given a precise formulation within first-order logic. Such a logical framework can be characterized easily in an informal way. This is the logic that assumes:
(a) one kind of variable; (b) logical constants, mainly the sentential connectives such as and ; (c) a notation for the universal and existential quantifiers; and (d) the identity symbol =.
A language formulated within such a logical framework is often called an elementary language. Ordinarily, three kinds of nonlogical constants occur in axiomatizing a theory in such a language-the relation symbols, also called predicates, the operation symbols and the individual constants. The grammatical expressions of the language are divided into terms and formulas, and recursive definitions of each are given. The simplest terms are variables or individual constants. New terms are built up by combining simpler terms with operation syinbols in a recursive manner. Atomic formulas consist o r a single predicate and the appropriate number of terms. Compound formulas are built up from atomic f'orinulas by means of sentential connectives and quantifiers.
Possible realizations of elementary theories, i.e., theories formulated in an elementary language, assume an especially simple form. First, there is a nonempty domain for the structure. Second, corresponding to any relation syn~bol of the theory, there is a corresponding relation, including sets representing predicates as one-place relations. Corresponding to any operation symbols in the theory are operations defined on the domain of the structure, and, finally, individual objects of the domain correspond to the individual nonlogical constants of the theory. I t is worth noting in passing that the definition of isomorphism for such elementary structures is straightforward and simple, which is not always the case for theories formulated in more con~plicated set-theoretical languages.
Some Positive Resrllts About Axiomatizrrbilit~v
The first positive result uses two concepts. First, the set of all the finite models of a theory is called a,finirary class of elementary structures. Second. a theory is recursively axiomatizable when there is an algorithm for deciding whether or not any formula of the language is an axiom of the theory in question.
Theorem 1 A urliuersal senlencr is one that has only universal quantifiers at the beginning with the scope of a quantifier the remainder of the sentence. In practice, such sentences are written as quantifier-free statements to simplify the notation. The axioms of weak ordering given earlier are of this kind. T o be explicit, the conjunction of the two given axioms is a universal sentence? and this single universal sentence is, in this form, the single axiom for a weak ordering.
Theorem 3 The intuitive idea ol'vaught's criterion for finitary classes of models of a theory is easy to explain. Consider again weak orderings. Because the axioms involve just three distinct variables. it is sufficient to chcck triples oT objects in the domain of an e~npirical structure to determine if it is a model of the theory. Generally speaking, the number oT distinct variables determines the size of the submodels that must be checked to see if universal axioms are satisfied. T o have a universal axiom Tor a theory, or what is equivalent. a finite set of universal axioms, it is necessary that the number oT distinct variables be some definite number, say n. By examining subnlodels involving no more than rl objects, it is then sufficient to determine satisfaction of the axiom or axioms, and this is the intuitive idea of Vaught's criterion. It is natural to interpret the negative result stated in the general form here as showing that the complexity oT relationships in finitary classes satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem is unbounded, at least u~lbounded when the theory must be expressed by quantifier-free formulas of elementary logic.
The first application is something rather surprising. A semi-order is a structure (A, >) satisfying the following three axioms. What is now surprising is a result about the indistinguishability relation for semiorders', that is, the relation -that is the negation of the characterization of the semiorder, namely, for a and b in A
Axiom 1 It is not the case that
The following theorem is due to Roberts (1969 The next case oT a negative result applying the negation oT Vaught's criterion (Theorem 3) is the proof that the qualitative theory of utility differences or the qualitative theory, more generally, of various psycholnetric sensations is not axiolnatizable by a universal sentence, contrary, of course, to the simple thcory of order. This result is due to Scott and Suppes (1958) .
Consider the elementary language whose only symbol is the quaternary relation symbol 'D' with thc intended numerical interpretation The intuitive idea of the proof can be seen from construction of a ten-element structure, all of whose substructures have a numerical representation, but which does not itself have such a representation. The idea of this construction can then be generalized for arbitrary n in order to apply Theorem 4.
Using the same ideas, Titiev (1972) extended the results of Theorem 6 to additive conjoint measurement and to multidimensional scaling with the Euclidean metric. Titiev (1980) also gives a negative proof for the city block metric for n < 3 dimensions.
Using more sophisticated logical results, it is possible to extend most of the results just stated to not being finitely axiomatizable. This means that ex~stential quantifiers can be introduced, but the number of axioms must be finite in character. The main results here are due to Per Lindstrom, which together with the other results mentioned in this section are presented in detail in Luce et al. (1 990) .
Theorem 7 The finitary clnss of rnensurer?leirt srructllres for algebraic d~ference is not ,finitely axiomatizable in ~lze elernentnrv language whose only nonlogical sjlmbo/ is the quarerilnry relation syinbol D.
In a way, a still stronger negative result about axiomatiiability can be proved for Archimedean axioms. Here is one standard formulation of such an axiom. Ifn 3 b then for some n, nb > a, where i~b is the combination o f n copies of b. Notice that it is necessary Axion~atic Theories to introduce a quantifier for integers not just for the empirical objects of the domain. Because the exact formulation of the negative result is rather COIIIplicated, the following informal theorem is given.
Theorem 8 For any standard elenzentory language used to,forniz4late a theory of measurement there is no set o f elernentc1r;v forrnulas of the language equivalerzt to an Archimedean asion1 for the theory.
The best way to think about the Archimedean axiom in this context is that it is a second-order axiom and, therefore, cannot be formulated by an equivalent set of formulas, in first-order logic.
Still another way of looking a t this result is that to characterize the real numbers we need some sort of second-order axiom such as Dedekind completeness, the Cauchy sequences or the least-upper bound axiom, but none of these axioms, including the Archimedean axiom, can be formulated in a first-order language whose variables take real numbers as values. Narens (1974) provides a general account of Archimedean axioms in various forms.
For deeper and more general results on axiomatizability there is much recent work that can be cited, especially concerning the definability of linear orders for classes of finite models and the problem of the complexity of the class (Stolboushkin 1992, Gurevich and Shelah 1996, Hetla et al. 1997 
